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The Wildcat Strike: A Wrong
Without A Remedy
I. Introduction
Congress enacted the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA) in 1947 in an attempt to curtail the growing number of
postwar strikes.2 Section 301 of the Act recognized labor organiza-
tions as legal entities 3 and provided employers and labor organiza-
tions a forum in federal district courts in which to sue for contract
violations.4 The legislative history of section 301' reveals that Con-
gress sought to eliminate industrial strife by making colective-bar-
gaining agreements binding and enforceable upon the contracting
parties. Recent developments in the application of certain provi-
sions of the LMRA, however, have eviscerated this mutual responsi-
bility. Consequently, employees can breach their collectively agreed
upon obligations with impunity.6
Most collective-bargaining agreements contain no-strike and ar-
I. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1976).
2. In 1945, the nation lost approximately 38 million man-days of labor because of
strikes. Within the next year this figure more than tripled, exceeding 116 million man-days of
labor. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1947).
3. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 301(b), 29 U.S.C. § 185(b)
(1976).
4. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
5. A chronological compilation of the Senate, House, and conference reports, along
with pertinent excerpts from the congressional proceedings, is collected in NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT,
1947 (1948) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
The Committee on Education and Labor, reporting on the LMRA provisions that author-
ized suits in federal court, expressed the need for holding labor organizations responsible for
contract violations:
When labor organizations make contracts with employers, such organizations should
be subject to the same judicial remedies and processes in respect of proceedings in-
volving violation of such contracts as those applicable to all other citizens. Labor
organizations cannot justifiably ask to be treated as responsible contracting parties
unless they are willing to assume the responsibilities of such contracts to the same
extent as the other party must assume his.
H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1947).
The Senate also was concerned with enforceability of collective-bargaining agreements.
The Committee on Labor and Public Welfare stated that:
If unions can break agreements with relative impunity, then such agreements do not
tend to stabilize industrial relations. . . . [W]ithout some effective method of assur-
ing freedom from economic warfare for the term of the agreement, there is little
reason why an employer would desire and sign such a contract.
S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 15 (1947).
6. See generally infra notes 68-122 and accompanying text.
bitration clauses7 designed to promote peaceful dispute resolution
during the term of the agreement. These provisions represent com-
promises by both the employer and the union-the employer yields
traditional managerial autonomy by agreeing to submit grievances
to an arbitrator, and, in return, the union waives the right to exert
economic pressure on the employer by interrupting production.8
Nevertheless, mere execution of these agreements does not alone
promote industrial peace.9 The widespread occurrence of wildcat
strikes clearly illustrates the ineffectiveness of inserting these coter-
minous clauses into a collective-bargaining agreement to prevent
violations.10
Despite the costly'" and disruptive effects that wildcat strikes
have on industrial harmony, the United States Supreme Court, in
two recent cases, condoned this type of employee activity. In a 1979
decision,' 2 the Court posited that neither an international union nor
its regional subdivision could incur liability in damages under sec-
tion 301 absent evidence that the international union or its subdivi-
sion had instigated, supported, ratified, or encouraged the unlawful
strike. Moreover, the Court determined that the international union
had no obligation to use all reasonable means available to prevent or
7. A typical no-strike clause states that: "[Tihe unions and employers agree that there
shall be no strike, tie-up of equipment, slowdowns or walkouts on the part of the employee
...without first using all possible means of settlement, as provided in this Agreement, of any
controversy which might arise." AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD
OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA AND COMPLETE
AUTO TRANSIT, INC. AT ARTICLE 7 (1973).
When the parties agree only on the arbitration clause, courts typically imply a duty not to
strike until the arbitration proceedings are exhausted. The coterminous obligations thus im-
posed on labor and management encourage peaceful adjustment of industrial disputes by con-
sensual procedures. See Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 381-82 (1974); Local 174,
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105-06 (1962); Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Teamsters Local 326, 624 F.2d 1182 (3d Cir. 1980). See also Arouca, Damages/or Unlawful
Strikes under the Railway Labor Act, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 779, 796 (1981).
8. Rosenberg, Current Developments of the NLRB, 7 EMPLOYEE RELATIONS L.J. 288
(1981).
9. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 101 S. Ct. 1836 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1947).
10. The term "wildcat strike" refers to an unauthorized work stoppage during the term of
a collective bargaining contract. Kerr and Siegel, The Interindustry Propensity to Strike - An
International Comparison, in Brett and Goldberg, Wildcat Strikes in Bituminous Coal Mining,
32 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 465 (1979).
Wildcat strikes particularly plague the bituminous coal mining industry. From 1971 to
1974, the industry experienced an average of more than 1500 wildcat strikes per year. This
rate doubled in the 1975-77 period to an average of more than 3,000 strikes per year. Id
1I. Strikes cost the employer an estimated $200-300 per day per man, depending on the
size of the company. These costs include obvious losses such as diminished productivity and
decreased sales, as well as derivative costs such as expenses incurred in training strikers'
replacements, loss of executive time as higher paid executives perform production activities,
and loss of dependability from the buyer's viewpoint, resulting in cancelled and unrenewed
orders. Imberman, Strikes Cost More Than You Think, 57 HARv. BUS. REV. 133 (May-June
1979). Cf. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Int'l Union, UMWA, 500 F. Supp. 72 (D. Utah 1980)
($15,000-$25,000 per day).
12. Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 444 U.S. 212 (1979). See infra
notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
end the strike. Two years later, the Supreme Court ruled that section
301 did not sanction a damage action brought against individual em-
ployees who violated the no-strike provisions of their collective-bar-
gaining agreements.' 3 The prohibition applied whether or not the
union participated in or authorized the unlawful work stoppage.
These two decisions have effectively eliminated any practicable rem-
edy available to an employer damaged by a wildcat strike.
This comment will examine the remedies currently available to
an employer damaged by a wildcat strike in light of these two
Supreme Court decisions, illustrating the inadequacies of each alter-
native. Additionally, the comment proposes possible statutory
amendments to the LMRA and the National Labor Relations Act 4
(NLRA) that would provide a viable solution to the imbalance in
labor relations currently hindering the federal policy of promoting
industrial stability through encouragement of collective bargaining.
II. Historical Background
A. Legislative History of the LMRAt
By 1947, organized labor in the United States had developed to
the extent that it no longer required the NLRA's paternalistic protec-
tions.' 5 Moreover, Congress recognized the growing imbalance in
labor relations in favor of unions and promulgated the LMRA in an
attempt to redress this imbalance.' 6 Congress accomplished repara-
tion under the LMRA primarily by establishing union unfair labor
practices that made unions more accountable for their actions.'
7
L Section 301(a). -Section 301(a) of the LMRA"8 manifests
the congressional desire to alleviate procedural difficulties existing in
13. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 101 S. Ct. 1836 (1981). See infra notes 54-67
and accompanying text.
14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1976).
15. Prior to enactment of the LMRA in 1947, Congress enacted the NLRA to encourage
collective bargaining and to protect employees' rights of freedom of association, self-organiza-
tion and designation of representatives of their own choosing. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). Ac-
cordingly, the NLRA contained no provisions for union unfair labor practices.
In his dissenting opinion in Complete Auto Transit v. Reis, 101 S. Ct. 1836 (1981), Chief
Justice Burger noted that: "[T]he American labor movement has matured sufficiently so that
neither unions nor their members need this kind of artificial, excessively paternalistic protec-
tion for admittedly illegal acts-a protection contrary to centuries-old concepts of individual
accountability." Id at 1851.
16. 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1976) (stating the purpose and policy of the LMRA); H.R. REP.
No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-6 (1947); S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1947).
17. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976), as amended by Act of
Aug. 22, 1947, PuB. L. No. 101, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. (1947).
18. Labor Management Relations Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
§ 185. Suits by and against labor organizations.
(a) Venue, amount, and citizenship.
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter,
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
some states when an employer attempts to sue a union. 9 Congress
enacted section 301(a) to provide a mechanism to ensure that a col-
lective-bargaining agreement would remain a viable institution in
the framework of national labor policy by allowing the parties access
to federal courts to enforce the agreement.2" Furthermore, Congress
considered the promotion of a "higher degree of responsibility"', as
crucial in promoting industrial peace.
Congress recognized the difficulty in holding unions responsible
for their obligations under collective-bargaining agreements unless
unions were recognized as legal entities.22 The Senate report23 em-
phasized that mutual responsibility of parties was necessary to vital-
ize collective-bargaining agreements, but could not be achieved
unless labor organizations received recognition as legal entities. Sec-
tion 301(b) 24 addressed this concern by expressly authorizing suits by
and against the union as an entity and not merely as an association
of union members.
2 Section 301(b). -In addition to recognizing unions as legal
entities, section 301(b) precludes an employer from suing individual
union members to satisfy a monetary judgment obtained against the
union for breach of contract. Congress inserted this clause to avoid a
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
19. 93 CONG. REC. 5014 (1947) (Senator Ball); 93 CONG. REC. 3839 (1947) (Senator
Taft).
20. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
21. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1947); Brief for Petitioner at 13, Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 101 S. Ct. 1836 (1981).
22. Prior to enactment of § 301(b), unions were not recognized as legal entities and,
therefore, could not be sued. The situation was analogous to the distinction between corporate
liability and the personal liability of shareholders. Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459
(1959).
The Senate Report discussing § 301(b) indicates the importance of making the union a
legal entity to ensure the inviolability of the collective-bargaining agreement:
It is apparent that until all jurisdictions, and particularly the Federal Government,
authorize actions against labor unions as legal entities, there will not be the mutual
responsibility necessary to vitalize collective-bargaining agreements. The Congress
has protected the rights of workers to organize, it has passed laws to encourage and
promote collective bargaining.
S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 47 (1947); Brief for Respondent at 13, Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 101 S. Ct. 1836 (1981).
23. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 47 (1947).
24. Labor Management Relations Act § 301(b), 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1976), provides the
following:
(b) Responsibility for acts of agent; entity for purposes of suit; enforcement of
money judgments.
Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter and any employer whose activities affect com-
merce as defined in this chapter shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such
labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees
whom it represents in the courts of the United States. Any money judgment against a
labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be enforceable only
against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforcea-
ble against any individual member or his assets.
repeat of the Danbury Hatters25 situation in which individual union
members' assets were attached to satisfy a judgment obtained against
their union. Although the LMRA prohibits holding individual
members liable for the union's wrongful acts, the act does not explic-
itly address the situation in which individual union members, with-
out union authorization or ratification, act in contravention to the
collective-bargaining agreement.
B. Individual Liability Under Section 301
L Defning the Problem. -Since the 1962 Supreme Court deci-
sion in Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 26 the issue of whether sec-
tion 301 authorizes suits against individual union members who
breach no-strike clauses in their contracts has frequently resulted in
litigation. In Atkinson, 27 the employer and the union executed a col-
lective-bargaining agreement which provided that the union would
not strike over any cause that could be the subject of a grievance
under the contract's other provisions.2" A dispute subsequently
arose when the employer docked the pay of three employees. As a
result, over half the company's employees participated in a strike.2 9
In Count I of the complaint, the company sought damages in the
amount of $12,500 against both the international union and its local
for causing a strike over a claim subject to the grievance procedure.3 °
Count II of the complaint sought a judgment against twenty-four
individual employees, each of whom was allegedly a local union of-
25. Savings Bank of Danbury v. Loewe, 242 U.S. 257 (1917); Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S.
522 (1915); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
In Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962), the Supreme Court discussing
the legislative history of § 301(b), summarized the Danbury Hatters cases as follows:
In that case, an antitrust treble damage action was brought against a large number of
union members, including union officers and agents, to recover from them the em-
ployer's losses in a nationwide, union-directed boycott of his hats. The union was not
named as a party, nor was judgment entered against it. A large money judgment was
entered, instead, against the individual defendants for participating in the plan "ema-
nating from headquarters," by knowingly authorizing and delegating authority to the
union officers to do the acts involved. In the debates, Senator Ball, one of the Act's
sponsors, declared that § 301, "by providing that the union may sue and be sued as a
legal entity, for a violation of contract, and that liability for damages will lie against
union assets only, will prevent a repetition of the Danbury Hatters case, in which
many members lost their, homes."
Id at 248 (citations omitted).
Senator Taft, who sponsored the LMRA in the Senate, expressed concern that the Dan-
bury Hatters situation not be repeated. See generally 92 CONG. REC. 5705 (1946) (statement of
Senator Taft) ("We do not want to perpetuate such a condition").
26. 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
27. Id
28. The contract's no-strike clause provided that: "[T]here shall be no strikes... (1) For
any cause which is or may be the subject of a grievance. . . or (2) For any other cause, except
upon written notice by the Union to the Employer. ... Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co.,
370 U.S. 238, 241 n.l (1962).
29. The complaint alleged that 999 of the 1700 employees participated in the work
stoppage.
30. 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
ficer and an agent of the international union. 1
The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's denial of the
motion to dismiss Count I, but reversed the decision to uphold
Count II. The Court ruled that, when the union is liable in damages
for a violation of the collective-bargaining agreement, the organiza-
tion's officers and members are not liable under section 301(b) of the
LMRA. Consequently, Count II failed to state a cause of action.
32
The Atkinson Court recognized a duty to formulate federal law to
govern section 301(a) suits3 3 and opined that section 301(b) evi-
denced a "congressional intention that the union, as an entity. . . be
the sole source of recovery for injury inflicted by it."'34 In reaching
this conclusion, however, the Court expressly reserved the question
whether a proper 301(a) claim could be maintained if the complaint
charged unauthorized, individual action in contravention to the col-
lective-bargaining contract.35
2. Federal Court Decisions Applying Section 301. -Nine years
after the Atkinson decision, in Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Oil, Chemical and
Atomic Workers International Union,3 6 the Seventh Circuit Court of
31. Id
32. In dismissing the complaint against the individual defendants, the Supreme Court
noted that the allegations in Count I of the complaint, charging that the union caused the
strike, contradicted the allegations contained in Count II that the individual defendants acted
not in behalf of the union but in their personal and nonunion capacity. The Court, therefore,
did not consider whether a complaint charging unauthorized, individual action would state a
cause of action. Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 249 n.7 (1962).
33. Id at 248. The Atkinson Court acknowledged that the judiciary's duty includes for-
mulating a body of case law to govern § 301(a) suits. This acknowledgement supported the
Court's decision in Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), in
which the Court first pronounced that § 301 of the LMRA was not merely jurisdictional.
The Lincoln Mills Court granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement in the circuit courts
over whether § 301(a) provided a source of substantive law, and, if so, what that law was. The
Court responded affirmatively, remarking that:
We would undercut the Act and defeat its policy if we read § 301 narrowly as only
conferring jurisdiction over labor organizations.
The question then is, what is the substantive law to be applied in suits under
§ 301(a)? We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301(a) is
federal law which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws.
The Labor Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some substantive law. It
points out what the parties may or may not do in certain situations. Other problems
will lie in the penumbra of express statutory mandates. Some will lack express statu-
tory sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and fash-
ioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness
will be determined by the nature of the problem.
353 U.S. at 456-57 (citations omitted).
34. 370 U.S. at 249 (1962) (quoting Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459, 470
(1960)).
35. Id at 249 n.7.
36. 452 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1971). In Sinclair, employees in both the maintenance and
production unit and the clerical unit struck the employer. The employer and the maintenance
and production unit entered into an agreement that contained a no-strike clause. The clerks
remained on strike and the maintenance and production workers refused to cross the picket
line. The employer subsequently sued those union members who refused to cross the picket
line. Accord Great Scott! Supermarkets, Inc. v. Goodman, 50 Mich. App. 635, 213 N.W.2d 762
(1974).
Appeals affirmed the dismissal of an action brought by an employer
against six individual union members for breaching the no-strike
clause of their contract. The court determined that although section
301 did not prohibit employer damage suits against employee union
members who engaged in a wildcat strike, neither did the section
expressly authorize such suits. Based on the reported Senate37 and
House debates38 that preceded enactment of the LMRA, the Court
reasoned that Congress fully recognized the problems involved in
reaching and enforcing no-strike agreements and that Congress did
not intend to subject individual union members to liability for dam-
ages. Moreover, the Court observed that the available remedies,
such as discipline or discharge of miscreant employees, sufficiently
provided substance to no-strike clauses without necessitating a dam-
age action against wildcat strikers.39
Two federal district court cases in 197140 and 19784' reached
decisions contrary to Sinclair Oil. In DuQuonin Packing Co. v. Local
P-156, AMCBWNA, 4 2 the court held that an employer's complaint
against individual union members for alleged violations of a no-
strike clause did state a cause of action. The court reasoned that a
contractual no-strike clause precludes a union from striking for the
duration of the agreement. To give validity to this interpretation,
unions must have some control over their members; however, unions
cannot maintain the requisite control unless union members are held
individually liable for wildcat strikes.4 3 Accordingly, the court held
37. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
38. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. See also Justice Frankfurter's dissent in
Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460-546 (1957). In Lincoln
Mills, Justice Frankfurter, in an unusual 86-page dissent, thoroughly analyzed the legislative
history of § 301 and concluded that Congress did not intend § 301 to encompass damage suits
brought against individual union members.
Prior legislation also evidences congressional contemplation that discharge serve as the
sole remedy against employees who breach collective-bargaining agreements. Such a provi-
sion was contained in the Case Bill, which is generally acknowledged as the direct antecedent
of § 301 of the LMRA. H.R. 4908, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. § 10(d) (1946); see also Charles Dowd
Box Co., Inc. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 509 n.6 (1962) ("Any employee who participates in a
strike . . . shall lose his status as an employee").
39. 452 F.2d at 54; see Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962); NLRB v.
Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953).
40. DuQuoin Packing Co. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of N.
Am. Local P-156, 321 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D. II. 1971).
41. New York State United Teachers v. Thompson, 459 F. Supp. 677 (N.D.N.Y. 1978).
42. 321 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D. 111. 1971) (Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Work-
men of North America); see also Certain-Teed Corp. v. United Steelworks of America, 484 F.
Supp. 726 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (intent of section 301 was not to insulate union members from
individual liability for disruptions caused by improper work stoppages); Westinghouse Electric
Corp. v. Electrical Workers, 470 F. Supp. 1298 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Maita v. Killeen, 465 F. Supp.
471 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Alloy Cast Steel Co. v. United Steel Workers, 429 F. Supp. 445 (N.D.
Ohio 1977).
43. The DuQuoin Court noted that, unless individual union members are held accounta-
ble for their actions, the union will lose its ability to maintain control over its members. The
Court stated that:
[This is particularly true] in those instances where the union does not participate or
that individual members of a union should not be permitted to strike
with impunity in violation of the collective-bargaining agreement
when the members are not "required or demanded or authorized to
so strike by their union officials.""
Similarly, the district court in New York State United Teachers
v. Thompson,45 initially noted nothing sacrosanct in the Supreme
Court's Atkinson decision that would insulate individual employees
from monetary liability under section 301. The court then rejected
the employees' motions to dismiss a complaint that sought monetary
relief for alleged individual and personal breaches of the terms of a
collective-bargaining agreement negotiated between the employer
and the employees' bargaining representative. The court felt that
"[tlo permit such conduct to fall outside of the scope of section 301,
would, in effect, leave a gap in the uniform, federal enforcement of
collective-bargaining agreements which the courts are instructed to
bridge with the degree of judicial inventiveness commensurate with
the nature of the problem."'
C. Supreme Court Pronouncements
L The Carbon Fuel Decision.-In 1979, the United States
Supreme Court took the first step toward resolving the question
whether an individual union member can be held liable for breach
of his4 7 collective-bargaining contract. In Carbon Fuel Co. v.
United Mine Workers of America,48 Justice Brennan, writing for a
unanimous Court, opined that, the absence of evidence that either
the international union or its subdivision had instigated, supported,
ratified, or encouraged a strike prevented the requisite agency rela-
condone a strike and does not request that its members go out on strike. The individ-
ual union members by their membership in the union have given their officers the
power and authority to negotiate and to enter into contracts with employers, subject
to their ratification. . . . History has shown that individual union members take ad-
vantage of the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement when it is to their
individual advantage. By the same token they should individually be bound by the
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement which they have ratified and be
liable for any breach of the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement which
they individually have caused.
321 F. Supp. at 1233.
44. Id
45. 459 F. Supp. 677 (N.D.N.Y. 1978). The United Teachers decision is arguably distin-
guishable from Atkinson. In United Teachers, the defendant employees received extended ed-
ucational leave with pay and then, in violation of their agreement, refused to continue working
as teachers for the school district. They did not breach a no-strike clause. In addition, when
the employees ceased working the remedies of discharge or discipline became unavailable.
46. 459 F. Supp. at 683.
47. The pronouns "he/his" are used throughout this comment in reference to the union
member. The words are used in their generic sense and should not be understood to connote
the gender of the union member.
48. 444 U.S. 212 (1979).
tionship required under sections 301(b) and (e) of the LMRA 9 Ab-
sent such evidence, the international or its subdivisions escape
liability. Furthermore, the Court held that there was no obligation,
implied in law, for the international union or its subdivision to use
all reasonable means available to prevent or end the strike; the un-
ions merely had an obligation not to assist in the members' unlawful
acts. °
In tacitly overruling the precedent that mere concerted em-
ployee activity implied union liability,5 the Carbon Fuel's Court
emphasized that Congress adopted the common-law agency test spe-
cifically to replace the "very loose test of responsibility incorporated
in section 2(2) of the original NLRA under which the term 'em-
ployer' included 'any person acting in the interests of the em-
ployer'."52  The ramifications of the Carbon Fuel decision
immediately became clear-unless the Supreme Court answered the
question expressly reserved in Atkinson in the affirmative53 and af-
forded a cause of action against unauthorized individual action, an
employer faced with a wildcat strike would have no recompense for
its monetary loss.
2. The Complete Auto Transit Decision. -The Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis54 expressly to
49. 29 U.S.C. §§ 185(b), (e) (see supra note 24 for the text of § 301(b)).
Existence of an agency relationship is a prerequisite to a determination of union liability
under 29 U.S.C. §§ 185(b), (e) (see supra note 24 for the text of § 301(b)).
(e) Determination of question of agency.
For the purposes of this section, in determining whether any person is acting as
an "agent" of another person so as to make such other person responsible for his acts,
the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized or sub-
sequently ratified shall not be controlling.
50. 444 U.S. 212, 218 (1979). The employer will recover its losses only if the interna-
tional union or its subdivision experiences liability. Although courts frequently infer the
agency relationship necessary to impose liability on the local, rather than the international,
union, the determination often provides little aid because the local union frequently is judg-
ment proof. See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 101 S. Ct. 1836, 1848 (1981) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring at n.10) ("The possibility that the local will be liable may be of little practical
benefit, however, because the local often is judgment-proof"); see also Brief of Bituminous
Coal Operator's Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 23-24, n.13, Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 444 U.S.
212 (1979) ("Many locals have bank accounts of say, $66.23"); see generally infra notes 69-83
and accompanying text for a discussion of the feasibility of finding an international union
liable for the actions of individual union members.
51. Eazor Express, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1975), estab-'
lished the theory that collective activity automatically implies union liability. See also infra
note 74 and accompanying text (discussing the mass action theory of liability).
52. 444 U.S. at 217.
53. Atkinson reserved the question whether a charge of unauthorized, individual action
sufficiently states a proper § 301(a) claim. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
The court in Consolidation Coal Co. v. UMWA, 500 F. Supp. 72 (D. Utah 1980), noted
that the absence of union ratification precludes a damage remedy. The court remarked that
"[i]f the union members, on their own, choose to violate the agreement, despite the earnest and
bona fide supplication of union officials, an employer is left without recourse for damages
incurred as a result of such precipitous employee activity." Id. at 77.
54. 101 S. Ct. 1836 (1981). In Complete Auto Transit, respondent employees participated
decide whether an employer might maintain a suit for damages
against "individual defendants acting. . . in their personal and non-.
union capacity. . .. "55 The court answered this question in the neg-
ative. Holding that an employer cannot recover losses when individ-
ual employees violate no-strike provisions, the Court rejected the
petitioner's argument that a damage action against individual em-
ployees is necessary to insure that employees "recognize their re-
sponsibilities ...and to deter them from unauthorized activities
that would undercut the stability of the collective-bargaining rela-
tionship."56 Notwithstanding a vigorous dissent from Chief Justice
Burger,57 the majority analyzed the legislative history of section 301
and concluded that section 301(b) addressed only union-authorized
violations of a collective-bargaining agreement. The Court extrapo-
lated a deliberate congressional intent to allow a damage remedy
only against unions, not individuals, and against unions only when
they participated in or authorized the strike. 58
In reaching this decision, the Court reasoned that a "significant
array of other remedies are available to employers to achieve adher-
ence to collective-bargaining agreements. . . -"I The proffered al-
ternatives included the following: (1) actions against the union when
responsibility can be traced to the organization for the contract
breach;60 (2) discharge or discipline of employees who unlawfully
in a wildcat strike despite a clause in their collective-bargaining agreement that relegated all
disputes to a binding grievance and arbitration procedure. The employees reportedly believed
that the union was not properly representing them in negotiations for amendments to the
agreement. Because the dispute was between the union and its members, the employer did not
seek damages from the union.
55. 101 S. Ct. at 1838 (citing Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 249 n.7
(1962)).
56. Brief for Petitioner at 25-26, Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 101 S. Ct. 1836
(1981).
57. Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, characterized the majority's opin-
ion in Complete Auto Transit as contrary to "literally centuries of the common law of contracts,
...[whereby] traditional notions of accountability for one's actions. . . govern." 101 S. Ct.
at 1849-50.
The dissenters found no support in the LMRA that authorized individual workers, acting
without union approval, to violate with impunity an agreement reached in arm's-length bar-
gaining. The dissenters reasoned that such a result significantly undermines the usefulness and
reliability of the collective-bargaining process, and will not advance the goals the Court claims
for it. Id
Chief Justice Burger poignantly criticized the majority's argument that prohibiting a dam-
age action against individual strikers will promote more harmonious relations between em-
ployers and strikers by preventing a long, drawn-out fight in the courts. The Chief Justice
rejected the argument that the employer's pursuit of damages for injuries sustained as a result
of the employee's initial breach would jeopardize industrial harmony, and analogized the ar-
gument to the youth who, having deliberately murdered both parents, pleaded for mercy as an
orphan. Id at 1851.
58. 101 S. Ct. at 1844.
59. 101 S. Ct. at 1845 n.18. Contra Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 101 S. Ct. 1836,
1845 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the decision) ("In fact, the reme-
dies said to be available are largely chimerical").
60. 101 S. Ct. at 1845, n. 18. See infra notes 69-83 and accompanying text.
walk off the job;6 (3) internal union discipline of defiant members;62
and (4) injunctive relief against the union for breach of the no-strike
provision when the underlying dispute is subject to binding arbitra-
tion.63 The Court doubted that a damage remedy would provide any
additional deterrent effect to these remedies and considered the dam-
age remedy dispensable when balanced against the aggravating ef-
fects that a damage remedy would have on industrial relations.
64
In concurrence, Justice Powell agreed that Congress intended to
foreclose a damage remedy against individual wildcat strikers, but
he labeled each proffered alternative as "unrealistic, '65 resulting in a
"lawless vacuum." 66  Without suggesting that a damage remedy
against individual wildcat strikers would be desirable, Powell re-
marked that the majority's decision did not promote orderly labor
relations, but rather left both the employer and the public interest
unprotected from wildcat strikes.67
III. Alternative Remedies
Federal labor law seeks to promote industrial peace through en-
couragement of collective-bargaining. 68 Accordingly, the NLRA
and the LMRA grant rights and impose obligations on both labor
and management. These rights have substance and meaning only
insofar as effective remedies support them. By prohibiting the main-
tenance of a damage action against individual union members who
do not honor the terms of their collective-bargaining agreements, the
61. See infra notes 84-98 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 104-122 and accompanying text.
64. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that a damage remedy would more suc-
cessfully deter wildcat strikes than use of other available remedies. The Court remarked that,
"[i]t is just as likely that damages actions against individuals would exacerbate industrial
strife." Id at 1845 n. 18. Contra Reply Brief for Petitioners, Complete Auto Transit v. Reis at
12, 101 S. Ct. 1836 (1981) ("The deterrent effect of the damage action . ..more than out-
weighs any incidental disruptive effect on the collective bargaining relationship").
65. 101 S. Ct. at 1848.
66. Id
67. Id Justice Powell elaborated on his statement that wildcat strikes harm the public
interest and the employer by commenting that "[t]he strike injures the employer, other compa-
nies and their employees, and consumers in general. Frequently, the strike is harmful even to
the majority of strikers, who feel obligated to honor the picket line of minority wildcatters."
Id at 1848-49.
68. Section 1 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976), codifies the
general principle that collective bargaining promotes industrial harmony:
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize
and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interrup-
tion, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of
industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly ad-
justment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other
working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power between employ-
ers and employees.
See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); NLRB v. Air Control Products of St. Petersburg,
Inc., 335 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Davis & Hemphill, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 142 (D. Md.
1969).
Supreme Court forecloses a viable remedy that would promote in-
dustrial stability through the normal processes of contract law and
traditional notions of accountability for one's voluntary actions. The
impracticality of alternative remedies illustrates the problem.
A. Suing The Union
The majority opinion in Complete Auto Transit" suggests that a
damage action against the union comprises one alternative to a dam-
age action against individual wildcat strikers. This remedy applies
only when responsibility for the contract breach rests with the union.
Because section. 301(b) of the LMRA expressly prohibits ". . . [a]ny
money judgment [entered] against a labor organization ... [from
being] enforceable against any individual [union] member or his as-
sets,"7 the individual employee escapes even vicarious financial lia-
bility unless his actions have furthered a union-authorized objective.
In addition, the significant degree of affinity required under Carbon
Fuel7 to impute liability to the union renders this remedy illusory.
As Justice Powell notes in his concurrence, only a "foolish union
. . . would invite a damages suit by explicitly endorsing a
strike .. "72
In Carbon Fuel, 73 the Supreme Court held that a union escapes
responsibility for the actions of its members unless it instigates, sup-
ports, ratifies, or encourages such action. Additionally, the Court
found no affirmative duty on the part of unions to interject their au-
thority into a dispute between rebellious union members and the em-
ployer to prevent or end a wildcat strike. This decision directly
contravened the mass action theory of liability,74 which implies that
69. 101 S. Ct. 1836 (1981).
70. Labor Management Relations Act, § 301(b), 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1976). The Act
mandates that any money judgment against a labor organization "shall be enforceable only
against the organization as an entity and against its assets. ... Id
71. 444 U.S. 212 (1979). See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text. See also Rigler,
Union Liabilityfor Wildcat Strikes. A Look at CARBON FUEL, 33 ME. L. REV. I (1981) (ana-
lyzing Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 444 U.S. 212 (1979)); Note, 8 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 565
(1980); Note, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1007 (1980).
72. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 101 S. Ct. 1836, 1848 (1981) (Powell, J., concur-
ring). Accord United States v. UMW, 77 F. Supp. 563, 566 (D.C. 1948), aft'd, 177 F.2d 29
(D.C. Cir. 1949) (unions sometimes employ "a nod or a wink ... in place of the work
,strike'").
73. 444 U.S. 212 (1979).
74. Courts have applied the mass action theory of liability when a large number of union
members act in concert. The theory emanates from the reasoning that men do not act collec-
tively in the absence of leadership. Thus, union liability is implied without proving actual
union authorization of the wildcat strike. United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 534 F.2d 1063
(3d Cir. 1976); accord Eazor Express, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd of Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951 (3d Cir.
1975) (no-strike clause included implied agreement that union would use all reasonable means
to avert wildcat strike begun by members without authorization); Vulcan Materials Co. v.
United Steelworkers of Am., 430 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1970) (a union functioning as a union is
responsible for the mass action of its members); Wagner Electric Co. v. Local 1104, 361 F.
Supp. 647 (E.D. Mo. 1973) (although no formal strike called, work stoppage in violation of a
no-strike clause constitutes union-strike activity). But cf. Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. UMWA,
a union is responsible for the mass action of its members. The addi-
tional requirement of express union authorization mandated by the
Carbon Fuel decision largely forecloses the possibility of holding a
union liable for its members' actions.
Justice Brennan's concurrence in Complete Auto Transit notes
that unions often encourage strikes cryptically rather than explic-
itly.75 Subsequent decisions have refused to find the requisite union
encouragement despite the union's refusal to discipline recalcitrant
members76 or to join with the employer in seeking an injunction
against the work stoppage. 77 Furthermore, some courts have so di-
luted the agency relationship necessary to impose liability on the
union that a mere renouncement 78 or a credible demonstration of
disapproval 79 exonerates the union from liability.
The structure of strike settlements also militates against viewing
an action against the union as an alternative to an action against
individual strikers. A typical strike settlement agreement contains,
as a condition precedent to returning to work, a no-reprisal clause80
in which the employer agrees not to seek damages against the union.
The no-reprisal clause essentially grants a full pardon to the union
notwithstanding the unlawful and financially damaging acts of its
members.
Additionally, an employer may elect to forego post-strike dam-
551 F.2d 695 (6th Cir. 1977) (union only liable for authorized or ratified acts); Peabody Coal
Co. v. Local 1734, 543 F.2d 10 (6th Cir. 1976).
75. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 101 S. Ct. 1836, 1846 n.l (1981) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
76. United Steelworkers of America v. Lorain, 616 F.2d 919 (6th Cir. 1980) (union's
failure to discipline strikers not evidence of ratification); United States Steel Corp. v. UMWA,
519 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1975) (mere failure to suspend or discipline striking agents does not
alone justify union liability); Ironton Coke Corp. v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int'l
Union, 491 F. Supp. 70 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (refusal by union to charge members who engaged in
wildcat strike in violation of union constitution is not actionable by employer).
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stretched the ratification doctrine further
than any other court by ruling that an international union's payment of strike benefits to wild-
cat strikers and receipt of a weekly strike report did not amount to ratification of the wildcat-
ters illegal activity. Federal Prescription Service, Inc. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters and
Butcher Workmen of N. Am., 527 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1975).
77. United Steelworkers of America v. Lorain, 616 F.2d 919 (6th Cir. 1980).
78. United States Steel Corp. v. UMWA, 519 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1975).
79. Consolidation Coal Co. v. UMWA, 500 F. Supp. 72 (D. Utah 1980).
80. A typical no-reprisal clause caused litigation in Randsdell v. Machinists, 443 F. Supp.
936 (E.D. Wis. 1978). The clause, in pertinent part, provided that:
There will be no reprisals, recriminations, disciplinary actions, grievances, or repri-
mands by either party against any employee represented by [the union] because of
any action or non-action during or arising from the strike. . . . [The employer] will
not initiate any further actions or proceedings in any court. . . seeking damages or
any other relief for any claim or cause arising out of the circumstances of the
strike. . ..
Id at 938.
One commentator remarked that a promise by management to withdraw a pending dam-
age suit is necessary to achieve sound industrial relations. Gould, On Labor Injinctions, Un-
ions, and the Judges. The Boys Market Case, 1970 Sup. CT. REV. 215, 231.
age suits for tactical reasons."' There are two reasons an employer
may choose not to sue. First, such suits may "exacerbate industrial
strife,"82 thereby delaying dissipation of the acrimony engendered by
the strike. Second, a damage action would necessarily involve de-
tailed disclosure of the employer's financial position as a predicate to
proving the amount of loss resulting from the strike.83 Obviously,
few employers willingly subject their companies to the in-depth scru-
tiny necessarily attendant to litigation.
B. Disciplining or Discharging the Wildcatters
Disciplining or discharging the striking employees comprises
the most widely acclaimed remedy against illegal wildcat strikes.
84
Although the NLRA protects concerted employee activity for the
purpose of collective-bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,
strikes by individual union members without union authorization
fall outside the Act's definition of protected activity. 85 Conse-
quently, employees who are threatened with discharge or discipline
cannot seek the shelter of the NLRA. Proponents of this remedy
claim that discharge or discipline of strikers effectively deters em-
ployees from violating the terms of collective-bargaining agree-
ments. Simultaneously, the remedy is claimed to be less disruptive
of industrial peace than a damage action against the wildcatters.
86
81. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 101 S. Ct. 1836, 1848 n.9 (1981) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
82. Id at 1845 n.18.
83. One commentator notes that:
By making a damage claim, the employer puts its financial injury, and thus its
finances, at issue in the litigation. The discovery rules of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure give the union and its accountants the right to explore every corner of the
employer's books. If the union conducts its case properly, it will know everything
from per-unit profit to the finer details of management compensation. The employer
may withdraw parts of the damage claim in an effort to limit the investigation; but it
can expect little success, given the liberality of the discovery rules. It is a relatively
simple matter for a union accountant to demonstrate how the unexplored area could
be used to exaggerate damages. Nor does it stop with the plaintiffs business. Where
transfers to related business entities are possible, the union will delve into the related
entity. If there is a possibility of misstatement by suppliers or customers, plaintiff will
find the union subjecting those parties to process and investigation. Understandably,
few employers want to run the full length of this particular gauntlet.
Whitman, Wildcat Strikes.- The Union's Narrowing Path to Recititude? 50 IND. L.J. 472, 474
(1975) (footnote omitted).
84. See, e.g., Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962); Mastro Plastics
Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers
Int'l Union, 452 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1971); Putnam Fabricating Co. v. Null, 497 F. Supp. 51
(S.D.W. Va. 1979), afd, 631 F.2d 311 (4th Cir. 1980); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Local
601,470 F. Supp. 1298 (W.D. Pa. 1979). But cf. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 101 S. Ct.
1836, 1847 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring) ("nor is discharge a realistic remedy").
85. National Labor Relations Act, § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976); see, e.g., NLRB v. Sands
Mfg. Co. 306 U.S. 332 (1939); Lee A. Consaul, Inc. v. NLRB, 469 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1972).
86. But see Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 101 S. Ct. 1836, 1851 (1981) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) ("I have difficulty seriously entertaining an argument that the employer is
responsible for jeopardizing industrial harmony by seeking damages for injuries it has sus-
tained when it was the unlawfully striking employees themselves who broke the peace in the
Although the remedy of discharge or discipline may appear an
efficacious deterrent, in reality this remedy is impracticable.8 7 The
ability of an employer to discharge wildcat strikers depends on sev-
eral variables, including the following: (1) the employer's financial
stability;"8 (2) the degree of skill involved in performing the strikers'
jobs;89 (3) the availability of similarly skilled replacements in ade-
quate numbers; and (4) the prevailing economic conditions.90 Ab-
sent consummate conditions, an employer, though legally permitted
to discharge striking union members, cannot realistically dismiss em-
ployees on a wholesale level without crippling production and forc-
ing the business into financial ruin. The striking employees'
recognition of the employer's situation diminishes the possible deter-
rent effect of discharge.
Additionally, the employer cannot discharge employees on a se-
lective basis because the NLRA prohibits discrimination against an
employee based on his membership in a labor organization.91 The
problem of discrimination frequently arises when union officials
contractually obligate themselves to take affirmative action to pre-
vent or end the strike. Neither the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) nor the courts have pronounced clear guidelines on whether
the employer may enforce this obligation by imposing more severe
punishment on union officials who assist the rank and file in disrup-
tive conduct. 92 While the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the
first place."); see also Whitman, supra note 83 at 481 ("[discharge) is the industrial equivalent
of capital punishment").
87. Justice Powell, in Complete Auto Transit, addressed the inadequacy of the discharge
remedy by pointing out that an employer cannot terminate all or most of his labor force with-
out crippling production. In other words, "the sheer logistics of hiring, training and acclimat-
ing an entirely new work force with suitable skills [prevents the remedy of discharge from
providing meaningful reliefl. Even if a new labor force could be recruited, the time and ex-
pense of this process, from recruitment to full production, could very well sound the death
knell of the business." Fishman and Brown, Union Responsibility for Wildcat Strikes, 21
WAYNE L. REV. 1017, 1021 (1975).
The significant number of wildcat strikes besieging the coal mining industry evidences the
lack of deterrent effect occasioned by the discharge remedy. See Note, Wildcat Strikes - The
Needfor an Enforceable Damages Remedy, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 493 (1980).
88. Unless an employer has compiled an adequate inventory to meet contractual obliga-
tions, the loss of revenue suffered in the interim between initiation of the work stoppage and
resumption of production with replacement employees can force the employer into bank-
ruptcy. See supra note I I and accompanying text.
89. The United States Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that it will take at least two
years to replace the 12,000 air traffic controllers fired in the recent PATCO strike. BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, Oct., 1981, Striking Air
Controllers Fired by President Reagan, 48.
90. Absent severely depressed economic conditions and the resultant high rate of unem-
ployment, workers are reluctant to cross wildcat picket lines.
91. Under the NLRA, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "by discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage
or discourage membership in any labor organization." National Labor Relations Act
§ 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
92. Indiana and Michigan Electric Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1979) (the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the NLRB's ruling that the imposition of a more severe
punishment on union stewards than on rank-and-file members is inherently destructive of im-
propriety of imposing a continuum of punishments on striking em-
ployees, the NLRB takes the position that any disparate treatment of
wildcat strikers constitutes an unfair labor practice.93 The appellate
courts do not uniformly enforce such Board orders,94 but the risk of
an unfair labor practice charge may nonetheless deter employers
from instituting selective discharges."
Even when an employer can selectively discharge wildcat
strikers without incurring an unfair labor practice charge, imposition
of the discharge remedy may be of no practical significance. As a
condition to returning to work, strikers frequently insist on reinstate-
ment of their colleagues.96 Additionally, imposition of penalties for
violating the no-strike clause of a collective-bargaining agreement
generally falls within the grievance procedures,97 and arbitrators fre-
quently either substitute a lesser sanction than discharge or refuse to
sustain any disciplinary action.9"
portant employee rights). See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. See generally Note,
Reaction to the Wildcat Strike - The Employer's Dilemma, 20 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 423, 432-
36 (1969) (discussing selective discharge of wildcat strikers).
93. E.g., Miller Brewing Co., 254 N.L.R.B. No. 24 (1981); South Central Bell Telephone
Co., 254 N.L.R.B. No. 32 (1981); Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co., 237 N.L.R.B. No. 35 (1978); Precision
Casting Co., 233 N.L.R.B. No. 183 (1977). Contra Fournelle v. N.L.R.B., 109 L.R.R.M. 2441
(Feb. 2, 1982) (when a collective-bargaining agreement imposes higher duties on union offi-
cials than on rank-and-file union members, doling out more severe punishments to the union
officials does not constitute an unfair labor practice).
94. E.g., N.L.R.B. v. Armour-Dial, Inc., 638 F.2d 51 (8th Cir. 1981) (denying enforce-
ment to NLRB's order of Sept. 29, 1979); Gould Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979)
(denying enforcement to 237 N.L.R.B. 881 (1978)); Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 599
F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1979) (denying enforcement to 237 N.L.R.B. 226 (1978)).
95. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 101 S. Ct. 1836, 1847 n.8 (1981) (Powell, J.,
concurring) ("The Board's position is so clear that employers may be deterred from selective
discharges").
Selective discharges are unlikely to induce the rank-and-file to return to work; rather,
such discharges may aggravate worker discontent and thereby prolong the strike. Cedar Coal
Co. v. UMW, 560 F.2d 1153, 1157 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1047 (1978); see also
Casenote, Labor Law - Strikes - Individual Union Not Liable for Breach of Contractual No-
Strike Clause Even When Strike Unauthorized by Union - Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Oil Workers
Union, 452 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1971), 86 HARV. L. REV. 447, 454 n.33 (1972) ("An employer
might attempt selective firing of the leadership of the action, but this might itself provoke or
prolong a strike").
96. Wildcat strikers arguably can force the employer to reinstate discharged employees
because:
The most principled of employers cannot afford to resist demands of reinstatement if
his business is on the line. However, if the employer does capitulate, he rewards the
strike, places a premium on illegal self-help and totally undermines the utility of the
grievance-arbitration procedure. This is not a pleasant choice. No labor force will
place its grievances before the arbitrator if it believes it can safely coerce a satisfac-
tory resolution by taking to the street.
Fishman and Brown, supra note 87, at 1022.
97. See generally Morrison and Handsaker, Remedies and Penalties for Wildcat Strikes.-
How Arbitrators and Federal Courts Have Ruled, 22 CATH. U. L. REV. 279-323 (1973) (thor-
oughly analyzing the causes and effects of wildcat strikes).
98. The overwhelming weight of arbitral authority holds wildcat strikers responsible for
disciplinary penalties in direct relation to their degree of participation in the unlawful work
stoppage. Phrased differently, employees equally at fault must not receive disparate penalties.
See Note, Reaction to the Wildcat Strike - The Employer's Dilemma, 20 CASE W. RES..L. REV.
423, 432 n.46 (1969).
C Internal Union Discioline
A third suggested alternative to allowing a damage action
against individual wildcat strikers contemplates subjecting the strik-
ers to discipline at the discretion and direction of the union. 99 Most
union constitutions permit the imposition of fines and penalties on
members who violate provisions of the union constitution."°° This
power, however, offers little consolation to the injured employer be-
cause revenues generated from fining disobedient employees inures
to the union and consequently does not lessen the employer's eco-
nomic burden.
The Supreme Court's decision in Carbon Fuel established that
neither the international union nor its subdivision has an affirmative
duty to prevent or terminate a wildcat strike.' 0t Consequently, the
union lacks incentive to use disciplinary measures as a means of in-
ducing members to honor their collective-bargaining agreements.'
0 2
This lack of an affirmative obligation ordinarily precludes any disci-
pline because workers often direct their recalcitrance not only at the
company management but also at the incumbent union leader-
ship. ' 3 Under these circumstances, the union's efforts to discipline
members only increases internal union disharmony and produces
counter productive results. Wildcat strikes evidence union inability
to control its members. Obviously, any union attempt to discipline
these striking employees only results in a further loss of support for
the union.
99. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 101 S. Ct. 1836, 1845 n.18 (1981). Despite the
Court's assertion that the union may discipline its members, the concurrence by Justice Powell
and the dissent by Chief Justice Burger refute this argument. Furthermore, even when the
union does discipline its members, "it may be too little and ... surely come[s] too late, after
the employer has suffered substantial losses to its business due to a strike that, under the con-
tract, should never have occurred." Id at 1851 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
100. Although most unions have the legal authority to discipline their members, they sel-
dom use this power. Id at 1848 (Powell, J., concurring). See Summers, Legal Limitations on
Union Disipine, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1951).
101. 444 U.S. 212 (1979).
102. In fact, there is a disincentive for the union to discipline its own members who par-
ticipate in wildcat strikes. "The union's impotence is demonstrated by its failure to control its
members in the first place. In addition, union officers may reject discipline in the hope of
appeasing 'wildcat' members and bringing them back under control." Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Reis, 101 S. Ct. 1836, 1851 n.4 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
The Court noted the same lack of union control in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 175 (1967). In Allis-Chalmers, the Court noted that "[wihere the union is weak, . . . the
union faced with further depletion of its ranks may have no real choice except to condone the
members' disobedience." Id at 183.
Indeed, in Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 444 U.S. 212 (1979), despite the expressed intention
of the International Union to discipline wildcatters, forty-eight unauthorized strikes occurred
at the employers' mines from 1969 to 1973. The union took no disciplinary action, however,
"[tfrom concern that such action might only aggravate a bad situation." Id at 214 n. 1.
103. In Complete Auto Transit, union members who believed that "the union was not
properly representing them. . . in negotiations for amendments to the collective-bargaining
agreement" rebelled against the incumbent union officials. 101 S. Ct. at 1838. "In these cir-
cumstances, the union's attempt to discipline is unlikely to be effective and may be counter-
productive." Id at 1848 (Powell, J., concurring).
D. Enjoining Wildcat Strikes
The final remedy proffered by the Supreme Court in Complete
Auto Transit" is an injunction to force wildcat strikers back to
work. The Norris LaGuardia Act,' °5 however, generally prohibits
this remedy. The Norris-LaGuardia Act provides in pertinent part:
"No court shall have jurisdiction to issue any. . . injunction grow-
ing out of a labor dispute to prohibit any person. . . from. . . ceas-
ing to perform work."" The courts have created limited exceptions
to this prohibition largely in response to the perceived need to create
"reciprocal rights and reciprocal remedies."107 These exceptions, al-
though intended to promote federal labor policy' °8 by encouraging
peaceful adjustment of industrial disputes through the use of volun-
tarily agreed upon procedures provide inadequate protection in
many wildcat strikes.
The Supreme Court, in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 109 rec-
ognized the restraints imposed by the Norris-LaGuardia Act on the
authority of federal courts to issue injunctions in cases involving la-
bor disputes. Although the Court held that the federal courts' equi-
table jurisdiction encompassed an employer's concession to arbitrate
any labor dispute, the Court declined to find a mutual remedy for
the labor union's coterminous obligation not to strike over any arbi-
trable dispute. The Court declared that the statute "was deliberately
drafted in the broadest of terms to avoid the danger that it would be
narrowed by judicial construction.""'
Eight years later, in Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union,
Local 770, "I the Supreme Court overruled Sinclair. While profess-
ing to uphold the validity of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Court
carved out an exception to the Act's prohibition against the use of
104. 101 S. Ct. 1836 (1981).
105. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1976).
106. Norris-LaGuardia (Anti-Injunction) Act § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1976).
107. Arouca, Damagesfor Unlawful Strikes Under the Railway Labor Act, 32 HASTINGS
L.J. 779 (1981). In Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970),
the Supreme Court approved the use of injunctions to enforce the no-strike clause in a collec-
tive agreement. "The Court sought to encourage negotiation of no-strike clauses and to pro-
mote the peaceful adjustment of industrial disputes by consensual procedures, notwithstanding
the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act." Arouca at 797 (citations
omitted).
108. Arouca, supra note 107, at 796 n.75. The Boys Market Court created a narrow excep-
tion to the Norris-LaGuardia Act's prohibition against issuing injunctions in labor disputes.
The Court felt that, unless employees agreed to submit grievances to arbitration, the avowed
national labor policy of promoting industrial harmony through collective-bargaining would be
frustrated. A no-strike obligation is the quid-pro-quo for the employer's undertaking such an
agreement and, therefore, "is necessarily dissipated if the principal and most expeditious
method by which the no-strike obligation can be enforced is eliminated." Boys Market, Inc. v.
Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 248 (1970).
109. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
110. Id at 203.
111. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
equitable remedies to terminate labor disputes. "2 This limited ex-
ception allows employers to obtain an injunction against striking
employees when their collective-bargaining agreements contain a
mutually binding mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration
procedure. The Court justified its action by rationalizing that "em-
ployers will be wary of assuming obligations to arbitrate specifically
enforceable against them when no similarly efficacious remedy is
available to enforce the concomitant undertaking of the union to re-
frain from striking."' "I3 The Boys Market Court thus forwarded, in
the Court's opinion, the Norris-LaGuardia Act's policy of favoring
peaceful dispute resolution.
Standing alone, the Boys Market decision affords an employer
confronted by a wildcat strike a viable alternative to a damage ac-
tion. The Supreme Court's decision in Buffalo Forge v. United Steel-
workers ofAmerica, AFL-CIO, 114 however, limited the availability
of injunctive relief to strikes over a dispute subject to arbitration.
The Court imposed this severe limitation on the Boys Market doc-
trine to preclude the issuance of injunctions aimed at restraining all
strikes arising from any contract dispute. Disputes in wildcat strikes
are often not between the union and the employer, but rather be-
tween the union and its members." 5 Strikes may also arise in sym-
pathy for a fellow union's strike.'16 Because such disagreements
112. Id at 253. The Supreme Court limited the Boys Market holding to cases in which
injunctive relief would be appropriate despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The Court re-
marked that:
When a strike is sought to be enjoined because it is over a grievance which both
parties are contractually bound to arbitrate, the District Court may issue no injunc-
tive order until it first holds that the contract does have that effect; and the employer
should be ordered to arbitrate, as a condition of his obtaining an injunction against
the strike. Beyond this, the District Court must, of course, consider whether issuance
of an injunction would be warranted under ordinary principles of equity-whether
breaches are occurring and will continue, or have been threatened and will be com-
mitted; whether they have caused or will cause irreparable injury to the employer;
and whether the employer will suffer more from the denial of an injunction than will
the union from its issuance.
Id at 254 (emphasis in original).
113. Id at 252.
114. 428 U.S. 397 (1976). In Buffalo Forge, the Court denied an injunction when the sole
basis of the claim was that the strike violated the collective-bargaining agreement's no-strike
clause. The strike in question began, not over a dispute with the employer, but rather in
sympathy for another union's strike. The Court declared that because the strike did not con-
cern a grievance subject to the arbitration procedure, no injunction could issue.
The intricacies of the availability of injunctive relief exceed the scope of this comment.
For clarification, see generally Note, Prospective "Boys Market" Injunctive Relief. A Limited
Remedyfor Violation of Collective Bargaining No-Strike Agreements, 1977 DUKE L.J. 233;
Note, Prospective Injunctions and Federal Labor Policy.- OfFuture Strikes, Arbitration, and Eq-
uity, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 307 (1976); Note, Sympathy Strike may not be Enjoined Pending
Arbitration ofits Legality under the No-Strike Clause ofa Collective-Bargaining Agreement, 8
SETON HALL L. REV. 89 (1976).
115. In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 101 S. Ct. 1836 (1981), the strike resulted
from a dispute between the union and its members concerning the adequateness of representa-
tion. As such, the dispute was not subject to arbitration and, consequently, was not enjoinable.
116. A sympathy strike occurs when a union goes on strike not because of any dispute
with the employer, but in support of other local unions or in support of any sister union's
literally are not over a dispute subject to arbitration, they are not
enjoinable.
Generally, the threshold question that determines availability of
equitable relief is whether the remedy at law is inadequate." 7 When
labor disputes are involved, however, merely granting an injunction
does not protect the employer from losses occurring in the interim
between the work-stoppage and issuance of the injunction. In this
instance, the problem reverses: the equitable remedy is inadequate
and only a damage remedy at law can restore the employer to his
former position.
Additionally, an injunction against individual strikers does not
deter their illegal conduct. 1 8 Employees feel safe to engage in un-
lawful activity because a back-to-work order is the only sanction
against them." 9 Allowance of a damage remedy would significantly
enhance industrial harmony by diminishing the occurrence of unau-
thorized strikes as individual union members realize that they could
be held financially accountable for their actions.
In practice, the success of an injunction depends on the effec-
tiveness of its enforcement. Employees typically ignore injunc-
tions. 20 Furthermore, absent egregious conduct, courts are reluctant
to use their contempt power to coerce employees to return to
work. '2 Historically, a comparison of the penalties for contempt to
the amount of damage inflicted on the employer illustrates the inad-
equacy of the contempt power in this circumstance. 122 The insignifi-
cant deterrent effect of these penalties, coupled with the realization
that the fines benefit the court that issued the injunction, not the em-
ployer, demonstrates that an injunction inadequately substitutes for
a damage remedy.
dispute with its employer. Such a strike occurred in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers,
428 U.S. 397 (1976). See supra note 114 and accompanying text for a discussion of Buffalo
Forge.
117. See generally DOBBS, THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.5 (1973) (discussing the "adequacy
test" as a condition to equitable relief).
118. The widespread occurrence of wildcat strikes evidences the lack of deterrent effect
afforded by injunctions. Note, Wildcat Strikes- The Needfor an Enforceable Damages Rem-
edy, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 493 (1980). See supra note 10 and accompanying text; infra note 119
and accompanying text.
119. Arouca, supra note 107, at 807.
120. In Alloy Cast Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 429 F. Supp. 445 (N.D. Ohio
1977), strikers ignored a court issued temporary restraining order for two working days, thus
illustrating employee disregard for injunctions.
121. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 101 S. Ct. 1836, 1847 (1981) (Powell, J., concur-
ring); see, e.g., Longshoreman Local 129 v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. 64
(1967); United States Steel Corp. v. Fraternal Ass'n of Steel Haulers, 601 F.2d 1269 (3d Cir.
1979); Black Diamond Coal Mining Co. v. Local 8460, UMW, 597 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1979).
122. See, e.g., Peabody Coal Co. v. Local 1734, UMW, 543 F.2d 10 (6th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977) (fine of $13,000; damages estimated at $400,000).
Additionally, "contempt is not a viable remedy because the contumacious party may
cleanse himself or herself of contempt by complying with the injunction." Arouca, supra note
107, at 807-08.
IV. Proposals and Recommendations
The proliferation of wildcat strikes in the United States evi-
dences the lack of an effective deterrent to unlawful employee con-
duct.23 The need for a feasible remedy against such conduct is
obvious. Without an adequate remedy, individual employees are
free to violate the terms of their collective-bargaining agreements
with impunity. This irremediable and unrestrained behavior
presents the employer with no incentive to negotiate dispute resolu-
tion provisions in future collective-bargaining contracts and thereby
frustrates the established national labor policy of promoting indus-
trial peace through collective bargaining. Accordingly, the following
amendments to the NLRA and the LMRA are proposed as a bifur-
cated suggestion to alleviate the court-created disequilibrium in la-
bor relations.
A. Individual Unfair Labor Practices-NLRA
Prior to the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments to the NLRA,
2 4
the NLRA proscribed certain conduct by employers that was per-
ceived to violate the rights of employees to organize and to bargain
collectively. 2 Congress, viewing collective bargaining as a vehicle
to promote the uninterrupted flow of commerce 26 through avoid-
ance of industrial strife, prohibited those forms of employer con-
duct' 27 considered inimical to employees' rights to organize.128 To
remove these impediments to collective bargaining, Congress labeled
certain employer conduct "unfair labor practices." Congress con-
comitantly conferred jurisdiction over these practices on the NLRB
and provided the NLRB with power to impose sanctions that would
best promote federal labor policy.
Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Amendments' 29 in 1947 to
respond to the concern that "certain practices by some labor organi-
zations, their officers and members [also] have the. . . effect of bur-
dening or obstructing commerce by preventing the free flow of goods
in such commerce through strikes and other forms of industrial un-
rest. .. ."30 The legislative history of the amendments establishes
the congressional belief that the government, under existing legisla-
tion, could not regulate certain union actions that were injurious to
123. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
124. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1976) (original version at 49 Stat. 449 (1935)).
125. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976).




129. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended by Pub. L. No. 101, 80th Cong., Ist Sess., 1947 (cur-
rent version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1976).
130. National Labor Relations Act § I, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
the national well-being.' 3' Consequently, Congress amended the
NLRA to establish union unfair labor practices subject to the juris-
diction of the NLRB.
The current labor relations situation resembles that which ex-
isted prior to promulgation of the Taft-Hartley Amendments. The
Senate 13 2 and House reports 33 discussing the original NLRA illus-
trate a congressional desire to make the collective-bargaining agree-
ment a "valid, binding and enforceable contract"'' 3 4 that would
promote industrial peace by imposing a "higher degree of responsi-
bility upon the parties to such agreements."'' 3  Although Congress
intended these amendments to foster union accountability for union
actions, recent Supreme Court decisions have opened the door for
individual union members to breach their collectively agreed upon
obligations without fear of sanction. 36 Amending the NLRA to in-
clude certain individual acts as unfair labor practices could end this
invitation to economic warfare. Unauthorized breaches of no-strike
provisions contained in collective-bargaining agreements would con-
stitute one such individual unfair labor practice.1
37
Although the NLRA currently does not include breach of con-
tract as an unfair labor practice, the states can enact laws that con-
tain such a provision. 31 Violation of a contract's express terms is
13 1. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprintedin I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 413 (1948).
The Senate Committee concluded "that such practices [by labor organizations] must be
corrected if stable and orderly labor relations are to be achieved." Id
The Report further stated that:
After a careful consideration of the evidence and proposals before us, the committee
has concluded that five specific practices by labor organizations and their agents,
affecting commerce, should be defined as unfair labor practices. Because of the na-
ture of certain of these practices, especially jurisdictional disputes, and secondary
boycotts and strikes for specifically defined objectives, the committee is convinced
that additional procedures must be made available under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act in order adequately to protect the public welfare which is inextricably in-
volved in labor disputes.
Id at 414.
132. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
134. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1947).
135. Id
136. As Justice Powell emphasized in his Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 101 S. Ct.
1836, 1848 (1981), concurrence: "The Court plainly is unrealistic, therefore, when it suggests
that employers have at their disposal a battery of alternate remedies for illegal strikes. The
result of the absence of remedies is a lawless vaccuum". (footnote omitted). Accord Wagner
Electic Co. v. Local 1104, Int'l Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers, 361 F. Supp.
647 (D. Mo. 1973) (an employer struck by the concerted action of all union members has no
remedy other than discharge or discipline of individual strikers, a remedy that is obviously
inadequate).
137. For purposes of clarity, the proposed amendment to the NLRA will be referred to as
section 8(h). Such an amendment would read as follows:
SEC. 8(h) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its members
(I) to violate a no-strike provision contained in their collective-bargaining
agreement.
138. The Senate Bill included a provision making such breach an unfair labor practice.
The provision failed in conference with the observation that "[o]nce parties have made a col-
not a federally protected right and, therefore, is subject to each
state's enforcement procedures. 39 Thus, in one jurisdiction, it is an
unfair labor practice for a labor organization, individually or in con-
cert with others, to violate the terms of a collective bargaining con-
tract."4° Another jurisdiction enumerates nine distinct classes of acts
by employees that constitute unfair labor practices. 1 ' The list of
prohibited acts includes the institution of a strike in violation of a
valid collective-bargaining agreement and the violation of the terms
and conditions of that agreement. 4 ' A third jurisdiction classifies
violation of the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement by an
employee, acting individually or with others, an unfair labor
practice. 1
43
A state enjoys numerous advantages by declaring a breach of
contract an unfair labor practice. First, individual state labor rela-
tions boards typically develop a degree of expertise that facilitates
decision-making and enables the boards to efficiently determine
which alleged contract violations are meritorious. Appropriate pen-
alties then can be imposed quickly. Second, a centralized body gov-
erning labor relations can adjudicate cases uniformly, thereby
providing labor organizations and their members with precedents by
which to govern their behavior. A diversified court system charged
with a variety of responsibilities cannot offer the same degree of pre-
dictability. Finally, state labor boards are not apt to decide cases as
isolated incidents. Rather, the boards will consider the cases in light
of the overall labor policy of the jurisdiction. Consolidation of labor
conflicts in a specialized forum thus promotes uniformity while es-
tablishing a comprehensive body of case law that effectuates prede-
termined labor policies.44
These same advantages could be enjoyed on a national level by
lective bargaining contract, the enforcement of that contract should be left to the usual
processes of the law and not to the National Labor Relations Board." H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1947), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MAN-
AGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 546.
Courts uniformly agree that federal legislation has not preempted the authority of the
state to make breach of a collective-bargaining agreement an unfair labor practice. See cases
collected in Annot., 30 A.L.R.3D 431 (1970).
139. Although section 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976), protects employees' rights
to "engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective-bargaining or other mu-
tual aid or protection," wildcat strikes have been declared to fall outside section 7's zone of
protection. See, e.g., Suburban Transit Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 536 F.2d 1918 (3d Cir. 1976); Lee
A. Consaul Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 469 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1972); N.L.R.B. v. Blades Mfg. Corp.,
344 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1965).
140. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 69(2)(a) (1966).
141. MINN. STAT. § 179.11 (1966).
142. Id
143. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 11 1.06(2)(c) (West 1974).
144. The NLRA grants the National Labor Relations Board latitude to "make, amend,
and rescind,. . . such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of
(the] Act." National Labor Relations Act § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1976). The Board thus can
tailor enforcement efforts to the expressed policies of the Act. Id § 1, 29 U.S.C. at § 151.
amending the NLRA to include breach of contract by a union or its
members as an unfair labor practice and designating the NLRB as
the initial arbiter of disputes. In addition, various provisions set
forth in section 10 of the NLRA 145 allow the Board considerable dis-
cretion to remedy unfair labor practices. Section 10(a) 146 empowers
the Board to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor
practice affecting commerce. The power is not "affected by any
other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be
established by agreement, law, or otherwise."' 47 This provision ex-
cepts the Board from the restrictions imposed by other statutes and
facilitates the Board's ability to utilize a wide range of remedies. As
an example of the Board's unchecked authority, sections 10(h)'4 s and
0) 149 permit courts to enforce the Board's temporary restraining or-
ders despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act's proscriptions against the is-
suance of injunctions in labor disputes.'5 °
Section 10(b)'5 t of the NLRA imposes a six-month limitation
on the filing of an unfair labor practice charge. Restricting the stat-
ute of limitations to six months mandates prompt dissolution of dis-
putes that, left unresolved, disrupt industrial tranquility.
Furthermore, section 10(k)' 52 provides that, in limited situations, the
parties have only ten days from the filing of charges in which to sat-
isfy the Board that they have voluntarily adjusted the dispute. The
encouragement of both prompt and voluntary dispute resolution is
fully in accordance with the federal labor policy of promoting indus-
trial harmony through collective bargaining.
B. Amendments to the LMRA
In addition to treating a breach of contract as an unfair labor
practice, the LMRA must be amended to permit a damage action
145. National Labor Relations Act § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976).
146. Id § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. at § 160(a).
147. Id
148. Id § 10(h), 29 U.S.C. at § 160(h).
149. Id § 100), 29 U.S.C. at § 1600).
150. The Norris-LaGuardia Act proscribes the issuance of injunctions, temporary or per-
manent, "in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or
persons participating or interested in such dispute . . . from doing. . . any of [a number of
listed acts]", including ceasing or refusing to perform work. Norris-LaGuardia Act § 4, 29
U.S.C. § 104 (1976).
151. National Labor Relations Act § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976).
152. Id § 10(k), 29 U.S.C. at § 160(k). The 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments added
§ 10(k) to the NLRA. Although § 10(k) specifically addresses only 8(b)(4)(D) unfair labor
practices, iZe., jurisdictional disputes, this section feasibly could be expanded to encompass the
proposed § 8(h) unfair labor practices as well. (See supra note 137). Congress inserted § 10(k)
to allow disagreeing unions to peacefully settle their disputes without outside intervention.
Congress thought that such voluntary resolution would be conducive to harmonious future
relations between the disagreeing unions. Similarly, disputes between an employer and a labor
organization or its members who unlawfully violate a no-strike provision of their collective
bargaining agreement could benefit from a provision permitting the opposing parties to peace-
fully settle their differences.
against individual union members who breach collective-bargaining
agreements without union support. The Supreme Court in Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, ' concluded that section 301 of the
LMRA did not encompass suits against individuals. 5 ' The sug-
gested amendment to the LMRA would alleviate the inequitable re-
sult engendered by this decision.
1. Amending Section 301. -- Courts decide many section 301
actions on the basis of an extended analysis of the legislative intent
behind section 301. Before the Complete Auto Transit decision,
lower courts could not agree on whether Congress consciously in-
tended to preclude damage actions against individual union mem-
bers. '" Language in section 301(a) stating that, "[s]uits for violation
of a contract between an employer and a labor organization repre-
senting employees .... ",I156 contributed to the lower courts' disagree-
ment. The Supreme Court in Complete Auto Transit, however,
negated the various legislative interpretations and declared that sec-
tion 301 did not encompass suits against individual union
members. 
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The most direct, and perhaps the most efficacious, method of
ameliorating the harsh effects of Complete Auto Transit involves a
simple rewording of section 301(a). Adoption of the following
amended section 301(a) will enable an employer to seek judicial re-
lief for any financial losses resulting from an unlawful work
stoppage:
Section 301(a) contracts between an employer and a labor organi-
zation representing employees in an industry affecting commerce
as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations,
that are violated by said labor organization or its members, may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdic-
tion of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
153. 101 S. Ct. 1836 (1981).
154. See supra notes 54-67 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 614 F.2d 1110, 1115 (6th Cir. 1980)
("we think that when section 301 was enacted, it had no intention of subjecting union members
engaging in wildcat strikes to individual liability for damages"); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Oil,
Chemical and Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 452 F.2d 49, 54 (7th Cir. 1971); Putnam
Fabricating Co. v. Null, 497 F. Supp. 51 (S.D. W. Va. 1979); af'd, 631 F.2d 311 (4th Cir.
1980); Ironton Coke Corp. v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 491 F. Supp. 70
(S.D. Ohio 1980); Lakeshore Motor Freight v. Int'l Bhd of Teamsters, 483 F. Supp. 1150 (W.D.
Pa. 1980); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Int'l Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Work-
ers Local 601, 470 F. Supp. 1298 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Great Scott! Supermarkets, Inc. v. Good-
man, 50 Mich. App. 635, 213 N.W.2d 762 (1974). But see, e.g., Certain-Teed Corp. v.
Steelworkers of Am., 484 F. Supp. 726, 728 (M.D. Pa. 1980) ("§ 301 [does not] insulate union
members from individual liability for disruptions they cause by improper work stoppages");
New York State United Teachers v. Thompson, 459 F. Supp. 677 (N.D.N.Y. 1978); DuQuoin
Packing Co. v. Local P-156, 321 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D. Il1. 1971).
156. Labor Management Relations Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
157. 101 S. Ct. 1836 (1981).
without regard to the citizenship of the parties. t'5
The proposed language will improve the existing statute in two
respects. Primarily, the proposal will provide a statutory device by
which an employer can maintain a lawsuit against illegal strikers,
regardless of union ratification of the strike. Thus, the common-law
notion of accountability for one's voluntary actions would govern.
Such a proposal would not affect the current principle that holds un-
ions liable for their contract breaches. The individual strikers would
be held responsible only when the Carbon Fuel standards of union
liability remained unsatisfied." 9 Consequently, an employer could
seek recompense for his losses regardless of the source of that loss.
Additionally, the proposed language will eradicate the ambigui-
ties inherent in section 301(a).' 60 Section 301(a) currently reads, in
pertinent part: "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization representing employees ... . The
question arises whether the phrase "between an employer and a la-
bor organization"'' 62 modifies the word "suits" or the word "con-
tracts." Courts generally interpret this clause to apply to a contract
between an employer and a labor organization and allow the main-
tenance of suits by individual employees for uniquely personal rea-
sons. 163 The proposed language resolves this ambiguity and clearly
articulates the existing judicial interpretation of section 301(a).
C. Advantages of a B!furcated Statutory Amendment
The preceding sections suggest amendments to both the NLRA
and the LMRA. Designating breach of contract as an unfair labor
practice under the NLRA and as actionable conduct under section
301 of the LMRA, would achieve the following objectives.
1 Separation of Powers. -During the debates preceding the
enactment of the LMRA, Congress noted that the courts, not the
NLRB, traditionally decided contract disputes'" and that, therefore,
labor contract disputes should conform to this practice. Ultimately,
158. Emphasis added by author to illustrate the major proposed revision of § 301(a). See
supra note 18 for the text of the current § 301(a).
159. Essentially, Carbon Fuel applies the common-law test of agency to the actions of a
union. Thus, unless the union instigates, supports, ratifies or encourages the work stoppage,
liability for the actions of the wildcatters will not be imputed to the union. See generally supra
notes 71-83 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 18.
161. Id
162. Id
163. Courts liberally construe § 301 as extending beyond suits between an employer and a
union to include suits by and against individual employees to enforce uniquely personal rights.
See, e.g., Hines v Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Smith v. Evening News
Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962); Maita v. Killeen, 465 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1979); New York State
United Teachers v. Thompson, 459 F. Supp. 677 (N.D.N.Y. 1978).
164. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
to avoid the fear of an improper delegation of judicial power, Con-
gress did not include breach of contract as an unfair labor
practice.' 65
That fear, however, is unfounded. The proposal to include
breach of contract as an unfair labor practice utilizes the expertise of
both the Board and the courts. Initially, when a claimant lodges an
unfair labor practice charge, the Board assesses its validity and acts
accordingly. Yet, the NLRA does not grant the Board the power to
award damages as a remedy for an unfair labor practice. 66 The
Board's remedial power is limited to equitable relief. Moreover, the
Board's determination of the merits of an unfair labor practice
charge does not bind any subsequent judicial proceeding for dam-
ages. 167 Thus, even when an employer's unfair labor practice charge
before the Board fails, he still may recover damages under a section
301 action brought before a court.
2. Minimization of Losses without Forfeiting Accountability. -
Presently, disgruntled employees have little incentive to settle their
grievances in accordance with contractually agreed upon proce-
dures.' 68 The preceding bifurcated proposal, however, provides an
effective deterrent to wildcat strikes while minimizing the employer's
loss. Thus, the proposal enables employers to file a section 301 ac-
tion against wildcat strikers and concomitantly dissuades those em-
ployees who realize that they will be held financially responsible for
their actions from participating in illegal work stoppages. Conse-
quently, the number of wildcat strikes would diminish significantly.
By adopting the proposed amendments, even wildcat strikes
that do occur will result in relatively minimal losses to the employer.
The NLRB's discretionary remedial powers allow the Board to
quickly terminate any unlawful work stoppages by procuring a
165. Id
166. Section 10(c) contains the NLRB's only authorization to award remuneration. This
section permits the Board to order reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, "as
will effectuate the policies of this Act." 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
167. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976) (strong policy favoring
judicial enforcement of collective-bargaining contract sustains the district court's jurisdiction
over § 301 suits even though the conduct involved arguably would amount to an unfair labor
practice within the jurisdiction of the NLRB); accord Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (court
has jurisdiction over § 301 suit even though conduct of employer that precipitates suit argu-
ably constitutes an unfair labor practice within the NLRB's jurisdiction); Smith v. Evening
News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
168. The remedies available against individual union members who participate in unlaw-
ful work stoppages inadequately deter unauthorized employee conduct. The Court's decision
in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 101 S. Ct. 1836 (1981), "holds that individual union
workers, acting without union approval, are a special, privileged class who may with impunity
violate an agreement voluntarily reached in arm's-length bargaining." fd at 1850 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting). See generally supra notes 68-122 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the inadequacies of the proffered remedies.
court-enforced injunction.' 69 The employer would incur losses only
during the interim between the initiation of the work stoppage and
the issuance of the injunction. Furthermore, the strikers have a sub-
stantial incentive to obey the injunction and return to work: the
longer the strike, the greater the losses suffered by the employer and
the greater the subsequent sanctions imposed on the strikers. Thus,
employees would incur direct accountability for the losses that their
illegal conduct causes the employer.
Congressional desire to avoid imposition of a potentially devas-
tating financial burden on striking employees is easily satisfied.'70
Restricting judicial discretion in awarding damages easily averts the
fear of financially ruining employees.' 7' A statutorily determined
ceiling on liability provides one method for limiting an employee's
maximum liability. Although such a ceiling may not fully compen-
sate the employer for his losses, if set high enough, the ceiling would
deter an employee from participating in a wildcat strike7 2 and mini-
mize the risk that an employer would suffer a large, uncompensated
loss.
V. Conclusion
The existing statutory schemes of the NLRA and the LMRA do
not expressly address individual employee activity that contravenes
the terms of collective-bargaining agreements. Generally, problems
lying within the penumbra of express statutory sanction find resolu-
tion by examining the policy of the legislation and then fashioning a
169. The usual Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibitions against issuance of injunctions in labor
disputes do not limit the NLRB's injunctive power. See supra notes 145-52 and accompanying
text.
170. The legislative history of § 301 reveals that Congress intended to prohibit individual
liability for the actions of the union. Unquestionably, Congress desired to avoid a repetition of
the Danbury Hatters situation. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
171. One recent law review note proposed that a ceiling on liability be imposed to placate
congressional fear of financially ruining wildcatters and, at the same time, to provide security
for the employer by permitting him to enforce the union's no-strike promise. Note, supra note
118, at 502.
172. Id at 503. Additionally, a compensatory scheme with a set maximum liability would
allow the employer to recover some money. Although union-imposed fines may offer some
deterrence to the employee, it "is difficult to perceive that an aggrieved employer would feel
compensated by that remedy." Id
An alternative to a ceiling on liability is to impose a "strike penalty" against an employee
who strikes in violation of a no-strike provision in his collective-bargaining agreement. New
York's Taylor Law, N.Y. CIVIL SERVICE LAw, §§ 200-214 (McKinney Supp. 1978), provides
that striking public employees in New York are fined two day's pay for each day they partici-
pate in an illegal strike. Although vast differences exist between public sector and private
sector strikes, a similar sanction could be imposed on employees who strike in contravention to
a no-strike agreement. Such a penalty offers an effective deterrent to unlawful employee con-
duct and consequently promotes a higher degree of responsibility upon the parties to a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement. Thus, the promotion of valid collective-bargaining contracts
would enhance industrial stability. See Peterson, Deterring Strikes by Public Employees: New
York's Two-for-One Salary Penalty and the 1979 Prison Guard Strike, 34 INDUS. & LABOR
REL. REV. 545 (1981).
remedy that will effectuate that policy. The federal courts, however,
have failed to implement the degree of judicial inventiveness author-
ized by these Acts to alleviate the harsh effects of contract violations
committed by wildcat strikers. The range of remedies presently
available inadequately deters employees from participating in un-
lawful work stoppages.
Clearly, only changes in the existing statutes will deter employ-
ees from violating collective-bargaining contracts. An urgent need
exists for amendments to the NLRA and the LMRA that will hold
individual union members accountable for their unauthorized ac-
tions. Without such amendments, individual union members can
continue to breach collective-bargaining agreements with impunity,
thereby undermining the usefulness and reliability of the collective-
bargaining process.
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